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with compassion and hope. However, I shall argue that such a view would be wrong.
First, Roberts does not explain why we should select these two virtues in particular for such special treatment. Second, I aim to show that humour lacking these qualities can still nevertheless play roles of vital ethical importance, such as fostering the selfrecognition on which self-knowledge depends. Insofar as self-knowledge is an essential factor in the development of the virtues, such a sense of humour can still count as 'virtuous'.
I. Humour, virtues and the human telos
The idea of a sense of humour as a virtue has its roots in Aristotle. In a short, often overlooked section of book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle recognises wit [eutrapelia] as a moral virtue, but chiefly because "one part of life is relaxation, and one aspect of this is entertaining conversation" (1128a). 4 I want to make a bolder claim about the ethical significance of a certain kind of sense of humour than this. It is valuable not only in a dinner party guest or such like, but is of much more central importance in the development of our moral vision.
According to Aristotle, a virtue is a hexis ([habitual] disposition). Moreover, it
is "the disposition that makes one a good man and causes him to perform his function well" (1106a). Roberts implicitly draws on this background: the idea that virtue theorists standardly presuppose the existence of a human nature and telos. He argues that to possess a virtue is to have realised at least one aspect of that nature, and that thus a virtue amounts to "a congruity between one's character and one's nature". 5 moral failure -where one falls short of the human telos in some respect -is an incongruity between one's nature or telos, and one's character. For the virtue ethicist, perceiving such incongruities "would be a mark of moral knowledge, and the disposition to perceive them could be counted an important part of wisdom". 6 But incongruity is often held to be central to humour. 7 Though humour only occasionally seems to depend upon outright contradiction (such as in the schoolboy howler "Lincoln was a great Kentuckian. He was born in a log cabin, which he built with his own hands." 8 But it is important to realise that an awareness of this ironic sense of humour is something that emerges over a growing acquaintance with Socrates' personality as one reads Plato's early dialogues: it cannot be captured simply by quoting isolated examples of it. 12 The reason why this is important will become clearer over the course of our discussion, but we can start to see the point by considering Roberts' claim that to perceive as comical the incongruity between a person's well-being and what they pursue as their well-being:
is an achievement quite above most of us, for whom there is little incongruity to be perceived in pursuing wealth, reputation, and physical well-being as the highest ends (even if we give lip service to Socrates' opinion that there is something higher). It is one thing to know that there is incongruity here. But to see it so vividly and so confidently as to see the humor in it suggests either that one is frankly native to the viewpoint from which the incongruities are perceived (like Socrates) or that one has been drawn into that viewpoint for the moment by a skilful humorist. 13 One important point that this quote brings out is that a genuine instance of 'aspect-dawning' is necessary genuinely to share the humour here. shall aim to deal with each of these questions in turn.
II. The ethical advantages of a taste for incongruity
The development of sensitivity to incongruity gives us several benefits. 17 Third, more specifically, the cultivation of such comic distance is necessary in the development of such virtues (or quasi-virtues)
as patience, perseverance and humility. In these and perhaps in other ways, a sense of humour can be a useful tool in the development of one's moral character. But I suggest that we shall understand this better by further investigating Roberts' claim that a sense of humor can be "an index of character". 18 Like much else in this discussion, this thesis has its roots in Aristotle, and it will be useful for our purposes to show these roots more explicitly than does Roberts.
III. A sense of humour as an index of character
Let us start by returning to Aristotle's general account of the virtues. Gestalt as provided by setting, background, mood, shared language, and experience; and it seems to be this sense of or orientation in the normal … that provides the "perspective" required for appreciating a piece of humor. 20 To find humorous, say, what Socrates finds humorous about people's tendency to pursue illusory forms of well-being depends upon our "having access to [his] perspective on human attitudes and behavior". to determine what it is like to inhabit it". 23 A large part of the 'skill' of Roberts' humorist is that he makes this imagining easier for us, at least in the sense that he initiates a process that may culminate in our genuinely coming to 'see' the world from this alternative point of view. It goes without saying that a prerequisite for such imagining is the ability to stand outside one's own current concerns. But crucial for our purposes is the question of what the result of regular exposure to such humour might be. In a discussion of this, Roberts makes the following suggestion as to the dangers of entering into a racist or sexist view in order to 'appreciate' racist or sexist jokes:
If I indulge regularly and gleefully in sexist humor, and have no corresponding taste and time, say, for humor that "puts down" male chauvinists, I should consider myself in danger of falling into a kind of addiction of "vision" which may lead to a change in my commitments and character. 24 However, what matters for our purposes is that there can be positive as well as negative "addictions of 'vision'." Just as a racist and sexist joke could be enjoyed, in the right circumstances, by one who is not himself racist or sexist, so "virtuous humor 11 like that of Socrates ... can be enjoyed by those who are not virtuous, though it is unlikely to originate among them". 25 What is of most interest about this for our purposes is the following claim:
[J]ust as the enjoyment of vicious [e.g., racist or sexist] humour is a "seeing" from the perspective of vice and has thus the tendency to convert one, or confirm one, in vice; so the enjoyment of Socratic ... humor is a "seeing" from the perspective of virtue and has the tendency to convert one, or confirm one, in 29 We do not need, for our purposes here, to go into detail about what Kierkegaard means by the aesthetic, ethical and religious existencespheres: it is sufficient to know that, on Climacus' schema, the ethical is 'higher' than the aesthetic, the religious 'higher' than the ethical. Most Kierkegaard commentators have been at a loss to explain why two forms of the comic, specifically, should play this "boundary zone" role. But our discussion so far about a 'virtuous' sense of humour enables us to suggest an answer. The role of irony and humour as "boundary zones" involves relating oneself to a 'higher' position that one has not embraced, but is nevertheless making some attempt to identify or engage with imaginatively, after the fashion of Moran's 'dramatic' imagination. The last quote from Roberts above makes it possible to see how, through such imaginative identification or engagement, the genuine appropriation of a 'higher' perspective might actually take place. Jamie
Ferreira has shown that, contrary to the popular picture of Kierkegaard, the 'leaps' of ethical and religious transition are not necessarily acts of will, but shifts of vision akin 13 to Wittgensteinian 'aspect dawning'. In particular, they are often realisations that a particular 'vision' has 'taken hold' of one, such that it has become "so real that it seems to be the only way to see it". 30 The kind of attractive redescription that makes such a 'leap' possible for a person could come about as a result of imaginative identification or engagement with a 'higher' ethical perspective. I suggest that
Climacus views irony and humour as boundary zones largely because they involve this kind of imaginative identification or engagement.
Relatedly, Roberts suggests that since a 'virtuous' sense of humour "is a power to see by the light of the virtues, it is a form of wisdom and therefore a capacity which in the higher reaches of its development surely must be counted among the virtues." 31 In fact, I don't see how this conclusion -that a sense of humour is a distinct virtue -is supposed to follow. But we do not need to agree with Roberts on this specific point to agree with his later, more plausible, conclusion that "humor, 
V. "Moral vision" and the sense of humour
Before leaving the foregoing behind, it is worth noting why the references to 'vision' and 'aspect dawning' are important. Having a "Socratic" sense of humour is indeed a matter of having a certain "vision": it cannot be reduced to, say, holding certain beliefs. 33 The philosopher who perhaps more than any other has been responsible for putting the metaphor of 'moral vision' on the ethical map is Iris And we can accept this conclusion regardless of whether we accept Roberts' further claim that a certain kind of sense of humour is a distinct virtue.
VI. The "ethical evasion" objection
But let us return at this point to the objection trailed earlier. This objection was that laughter -especially at oneself -could amount to a form of ethical evasion. For instance, Reinhold Niebuhr claims that laughter after having recognised "the depth of evil" is "the instrument of irresponsibility" 36 : a failure, ultimately, to take either the self or life with sufficient seriousness. This point, put excessively dogmatically for my taste by Niebuhr, is put somewhat more persuasively by Conrad Hyers:
It is possible to laugh at oneself as a way of excusing oneself, as a technique for not looking candidly at oneself, and of casually evading the deeper necessities of repentance, seeking forgiveness, and gaining restitution and change. Here humor, instead of being the servant of seriousness ... becomes the screen of irresponsibility ... Humor can become an easy path of escape from intellectual labor, moral accountability, and religious commitment. 37 (I take it that any reader put off by the religious dimension of Hyers' way of putting this point can readily imagine a purely secular ethical version of the same point.) 16 That this can happen is undeniably true. But we are now in a position to see that this objection simply reinforces the overall point for which I have been arguing.
There is no reason to suppose that the kind of Socratic humour we have been considering falls foul of this objection. Insofar as this humour is rooted in a perspective of virtue, and a realisation of the continual need to do ethical work on oneself in the life of developing virtue, such humour is, ultimately, "the servant of seriousness". 38 Anyone who fell into the trap that Hyers highlights would no longer be practising this 'humour of virtue'. The objection therefore simply reinforces the importance of our looking towards the right exemplars or role models.
VII. Criticizing Roberts: compassion, hope and attention to the particular
So far, the position I have outlined is broadly sympathetic to that of Roberts, though I have aimed to make more explicit than he does how such a position is rooted in Aristotle. Let me now start to put some distance between Roberts and me.
We noted earlier in passing the importance of fine 'discernment' to Aristotle's view of moral judgement. This discernment, Aristotle claims, lies in "perception". allied with compassion and hope". 39 I have already questioned the need to describe a sense of humour as a specific virtue. But even allowing for this, need we agree that a sense of humour cannot be 'virtuous' in our broader sense -that is, useful in the development of the virtues -unless it is allied with compassion or hope? I see no reason to suppose so. First, as mentioned earlier, Roberts does not give any especially compelling reason why these two specific virtues should be selected for such special treatment. Second, this part of Roberts' thesis is offered at too high a degree of generality. Let us consider these points in turn.
Roberts introduces the need for compassion and hope in response to the discomfort he anticipates his reader might feel with the idea of someone such as
Socrates "being amused at something as tragic as the failure of a human being to achieve his most essential well-being. Is there not something morally defective about a person who can be amused by this sort of thing?" 40 Consequently, he claims that the Socratic sense of humour is only virtuous if it brings with it a sense of hope for those at whom one is amused, which he contrasts with an aloofness and indifference to their well being. ("If it is ever fitting to be amused by somebody's being lost, it must be on the supposition that there is hope for him." 41 ) He claims that "Socrates' philosophy of persons seems to allow for hope that they may, in some mode of existence, come to themselves", 42 and behind this hope "must be a compassion which really does wish them well". 43 It is far from clear to me that Socrates is always this optimistic, and it may be that there are better exemplars under this aspect than him. If one were to make the best case one could for this part of Roberts' thesis, one might better turn to the would have been if she had been one, but most of them; then next to them -not above, just away from -were the white-trash; then above them were the homeowners, and above them the home-and-land owners, to which she and Claud [her husband] belonged. Above she and Claud were people with a lot of money and much bigger houses and much more land. But here the complexity of it would begin to bear in on her, for some of the people with a lot of money were common and ought to be below she and Claud and some of the people who had good blood had lost their money and had to rent and then there were colored people who owned their own homes and land as well. There was a colored dentist in town who had two red Lincolns and a swimming pool and a farm with registered white-face cattle on it. Usually by the time she had fallen asleep all the classes of people were moiling and roiling around in her head … 44 At the end of the story, her revelation as she cleans out the hogs 45 is of "a vast horde of souls rumbling toward heaven", in which "a tribe of people whom she recognized as those who, like her and Claud, had always had a little of everything" 46 march behind the blacks and "white trash" to whom Mrs. Turpin has always unquestioningly taken herself to be superior. In O'Connor's Catholic vision, Mrs.
Turpin's revelation shows her the fundamental equality before God of all humansincluding those she has always looked down upon. "The first shall be last, and the last shall be first." I suggest that O'Connor's compassion is shown in the fact that, however awful Mrs. Turpin is, we are never encouraged to sneer at her. And her hope is shown in the thought that even someone as narrow-minded as Mrs. Turpin might come to see the error of her ways. My point is that, although O'Connor undoubtedly encourages us to laugh at Mrs. Turpin, the presence of this compassion and hope gives the humour a fundamentally different character from what it would have if we had just been encouraged to sneer at her. Although writers on humour often distinguish between 'laughing with' and 'laughing at', the above draws our attention to the fact that there are also very different kinds of 'laughing at'. Razors pain you;
Rivers are damp;
Acids stain you;
And drugs cause cramp.
Guns aren"t lawful;
Nooses give;
Gas smells awful;
You might as well live. 51 Again, it would be pushing one's luck to describe the last line as manifesting hope. So it would seem -as with the Bradbury and Larkin cases -that insofar as such ironic humour excludes compassion and hope, it could not count, for Roberts, as virtuous. But, for reasons similar to those given above, I don't see why such a sense of humour should be 'out of bounds' to a person developing the virtues. Why, exactly, should such a person shy away from such a sense of irony? 24 The conclusion we can draw from all this is that Roberts' claim -that a sense of humour, in order to be virtuous, must be allied with compassion and hope -is too strong, too broad-brush. He perhaps recognizes this when, at one part of his discussion, he seems to qualify his earlier claim. He claims that a sense of humour would not be a moral virtue if it were "isolated from certain other virtues, such as compassion and hope". 52 On this view, perhaps he would concede that compassion and hope might, in some circumstances, be replaceable with other virtues. But it would be a mistake to go down the road of trying to isolate what other virtues or attitudes, as well as compassion and hope, might be candidates for this role. What we need is a less general approach than this: more "attention to the particular" and a greater sensitivity to context. Our earlier discussion enables us to see why. In the discussion of O'Connor, for instance, only by paying attention to the particular context in which the humour occurs were we able to see that there can be significantly different cases of 'laughing at', some of which should certainly not attract our ethical censure. is a part -can be a useful tool in moral education. This is again a specific instance of a more general claim of Aristotle's: that moral character is developed via habituation. 25 But we can accept all this without agreeing that a sense of humour is a distinct virtue.
VIII. Summary and conclusion
Roberts is also right to think that part of the fine discernment so important to moral perception will require us to see that a sense of humour could only count as 'virtuous' (in our broader sense) if linked to other virtues. However, he does not take on board an important implication of this claim. For I have also argued that Roberts is wrong to suppose that this can be cashed out on so general a level as the claim that a combination of compassion and hope is always necessary. In reply to his position, as well as pointing out that he gives no compelling case as to what is so special about these two particular virtues, I have also aimed to make plausible the idea that even humour lacking these qualities can nevertheless play ethically important roles, such as fostering the self-recognition on which self-knowledge depends. Insofar as selfknowledge is an essential factor in the development of the virtues, such humour cannot legitimately be excluded from the realm of the 'virtuous' sense of humour.
And we shall be best placed to see this precisely by being sensitive to the context in which such humour occurs: by paying "attention to the particular". Writers on the virtues commonly stress the importance of their context-dependence. A 'virtuous sense of humour', it seems to me, is no exception. 53 
